Mathematical  Culture and Thought

Mathematical Culture and Thought

Matching Mechanisms: A Brief View

Document Type : Review

Authors
1 Department of Mathematical Sciences, Sharif University of Technology, Iran
2 Pure Mathematics Department, Ferdowsi University of Mashhad, Iran
Abstract
Matching  mechanisms are essential in the economic behavior of human society.  It   can easily be observed in marriage, kidney transplant allocation, allocation of tasks, etc.  The main topic of the problem of matching  mechanism design  is to bring the two parties together while the greatest benefit occurs. The two parties should not have any reason to contradict in revealing their preferences. The purpose of this paper is to introduce  the reader to the topic of designing mechanisms and, in particular, adaptation mechanisms.
Keywords
Subjects

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  • Receive Date 16 January 2017
  • Revise Date 23 February 2017
  • Accept Date 23 February 2017
  • Publish Date 20 February 2022